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OVER MY DEAD BODY: A NEW APPROACH TO
TESTAMENTARY RESTRAINTS ON MARRIAGE
Ruth Sarah Lee

I. INTRODUCTION
Money is a tool that can be wielded from the grave. The deadhand may attempt to distribute money to shape the affairs, and
influence the choices of the living. It is not uncommon to find
deeds or wills that try to shape the behavior of the beneficiary by
conditioning a grant, devise, or bequest on a potential
beneficiary’s conduct. While not every conditional gift is
designed to influence the beneficiary’s behavior, many are
devised for that very purpose. Behind these gifts are different
motives from different testators – whether it is a desire for
control, benevolent paternalism, or even revenge.1 This article,
specifically, turns to the problem of restraints on marriage.
Testators (usually parents) write wills prohibiting, penalizing, or
requiring marriage to one of a particular religious faith or
ethnicity as an attempt to shape the beneficiary’s (usually the
child’s) romantic decisions.
Law Clerk to the Hon. Richard Suhrheinrich (Sixth Circuit) 20122013; Harvard Law School, JD 2012. Many thanks to Professor Jacob
Gersen and Professor Robert Sitkoff at Harvard Law School. I am also
indebted to Judge Ricardo Martinez of the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington State, Chris Nicoll of the law
firm Nicoll Black & Feig PLLC, and also Nicola Menaldo, Tim
Fitzgerald, Lura Smith, Carol Miller, Melody Byrd, and Jensen
Mauseth. All errors remain my own.
1. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 35 n. 11 (8th ed. 2009) (noting a 1993 Associated Press story
from Romania about how a “man who was nagged by his wife to stop smoking has
left her everything—but only if she takes up his habit as punishment for 40 years of
‘hell.’”).
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In addressing these restraints on marriage, many courts
have taken a “reasonableness” approach.2 Even cases that do
not explicitly take a “reasonableness” approach—but argue
purely in terms of balancing public policy goals—tend to use
language shaded with “reasonableness” rhetoric.3 A complete
(total or general) restraint of marriage is a restraint that prohibits
the beneficiary to benefit from the will if he marries anyone at
any time.4 A partial restraint of marriage is, in contrast, limited
in time or applicable to a specific class of persons.5
2. See infra Section II.B.
3. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. 2009) [hereinafter
Feinberg II]
([W]hoever will take the trouble to examine this branch of the law
attentively, will find that the testator may impose reasonable and prudent
restraints upon the marriage of the objects of his bounty, by means of
conditions precedent, or subsequent, or by limitations, while he may not,
with one single exception, impose perpetual celibacy upon the objects of
his bounty, by means of conditions subsequent or limitations.
(emphasis added) (quoting Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 212, 215 (1857))).
The Illinois Supreme Court in Feinberg II reversed the state appellate court decision.
Id. at 903. The appellate court ruled that a trust provision providing that a
descendant “who marries outside the Jewish faith (unless the spouse of such
descendant has converted or converts within one year of the marriage to the Jewish
faith) and his or her descendants shall be deemed to be deceased,” In re Estate of
Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) [hereinafter Feinberg I], rev’d, 919
N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009), was invalid without discussion of whether the clause was
reasonable or not. Feinberg I, 891 N.E.2d at 552. Instead, the appellate court had
ruled simply that “the provision in the case before us is invalid because it seriously
interferes with and limits the right of individuals to marry a person of their own
choosing.” Id. Furthermore, the concurring opinion for the appellate decision of
Feinberg I referred to the reasonableness test. Id. at 555 (Quinn, J., concurring)
(“While the Restatement (First) and (Second) of Trusts explained that restraints
such as the instant ‘Jewish Clause’ were once considered reasonable, the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts now provides that they are no longer reasonable.”).
The dissent in Feinberg I also refers to the reasonableness test. Id. at 555 (Greiman,
J., dissenting) (“It is generally held in this country that partial restraints on marriage
are valid unless unreasonable.” (quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 234
(Mass. 1955))). Although Feinberg I’s facts included a trust provision, the Illinois
Supreme Court interpreted the case as examining a testamentary provision.
Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d at 902.
4. An example of this is a will that leaves property to a beneficiary “provided
he never marries.”
5. See, e.g., Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 234
(It is generally held in this country that partial restraints on marriage are
valid unless unreasonable. Am.Law of Property, § 27.15; Scott on Trusts, §
62.6; Restatement: Property, § 425; 122 A.L.R. 7. Thus testamentary gifts
conditioned on the beneficiary not marrying a specified individual have
been upheld. Turner v. Evans, 134 Md. 238, 241, 106 A. 617; Graydon's
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However, the “reasonableness” approach has several
serious shortcomings, and fundamentally focuses on the
incorrect issue. The test suffers from at least four major
problems: (1) it ostensibly questions the testator’s intent while
ingenuously claiming that it does not;6 (2) it is empirically
unsound;7 (3) it fails to take into account whether the restraint is
actually consequential to the beneficiary;8 and (4) it produces
unjustifiably inconsistent results based on geography and time.9
Given these four problems with the “reasonableness”
approach, a discussion and recommendation of a new approach
is warranted. Thus, four principle alternative approaches are
considered in this article: (1) a blanket prohibition of all marital
restraints, most noticeably promulgated by Professor Jeffrey G.
Sherman;10 (2) a blanket allowance of all marital restraints
centered on the value of honoring testator intent;11 (3) a case-bycase balancing approach used by the court in In re Estate of
Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009)[hereinafter Feinberg II];12 and
(4) the possibility of pursuing a new test that does not suffer

Executors v. Graydon, 23 N.J.Eq. 229, 237-238; Matter of Seaman's Will, 218
N.Y. 77, 81, 112 N.E. 576, L.R.A.1917A, 40; In re Osborne's Petition, 21
Pa.Dist. & Co. R., 293, 295. A similar result has been reached where the
condition was against marrying into a named family. Phillips v. Ferguson,
85 Va. 509, 513, 8 S.E. 241, 1 L.R.A. 837. In Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 129
Md. 455, 99 A. 672, L.R.A.1917D, 464, a requirement that a niece marry
with the consent of her parents was held to be good, and there was an
added statement, 129 Md. at pages 462-463, 99 A. 672, that a second
requirement of not mar[r]ying outside the Jewish faith was also good.).
See also In re Harris' Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1955)
(Conditions in general restraint of marriage were regarded at common law
as contrary to public policy, and therefore void. . . . However, conditions in
partial restraint of marriage, which merely impose reasonable restrictions
upon marriage, are not against public policy. Whether a condition in
restraint of marriage is reasonable depends, not upon the form of the
condition, but upon its purpose and effect under the circumstances of the
particular case.).
6. See infra Section III.A.
7. See infra Section III.B.
8. See infra Section III.C.
9. See infra Section III.D.
10. See infra Sections IV.A, V.B.1.
11. See infra Sections IV.B, V.B.2.
12. See Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009); see also infra Sections IV.C, V.B.3.
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from the same shortcomings as the Reasonableness Test13
This article proposes a new test—the Coercion Test—as a
possible alternative for courts to consider in handling
testamentary restraints on marriage.14 If we are worried that the
deed or will forces the donee to surrender to an “unreasonable”
marriage or a life of loneliness, we should examine the extent to
which the donee is actually influenced by the grant. In other
words, instead of focusing on the donor’s “reasonableness”,
courts should focus on the donee’s need. The donee’s need—the
juxtaposition of his current financial position, how much he
would stand to gain, and how much he needs the gain, with
how much he would have received under intestacy— will show
how much coercion or pressure the donee is actually
experiencing from the will.
The discussion closes with a comparison between the
proposed Coercion Test and the other alternative methods. The
article concludes that the Coercion Test will maintain the
advantages found in the other alternatives, while avoiding many
of the disadvantages, and is therefore one of the most sensible
approaches to marital restraints. The Coercion Test is a sensible
approach because it avoids all four of the major problems with
the Reasonableness Test, provides more respect for testator’s
intent than a blanket prohibition, is more protective of public
policy than a blanket allowance, and provides more consistent
results than a case-by-case balancing approach.
Most
importantly, the Coercion Test addresses the crux of the public
policy problem: whether an individual is being forced into, or out
of, marriage.

13. See infra Section IV.D.
14. See infra Sections V.A – B.
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II. THE REASONABLENESS TEST
A. WHY MARITAL RESTRAINT PROVISIONS DO NOT IMPLICATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
In some of the cases involving the validity of a will
provision curtailing marriage choices, it has been argued that the
provisions are unconstitutional because enforcing them would
violate constitutional rights.
This argument has been
systematically rejected for partial restraints on marriage.
In United States National Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860 (Or.
1954),15 the testator’s will provided that when his daughter
turned thirty-two, she would receive a trust fund if she could
prove to the trustee that she had not converted to Catholicism,
or married a Catholic man.16 The daughter argued that the will
violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights embedded
in the United States Constitution.
However, the Court
disagreed, finding that the First Amendment “is a limitation
upon the power of Congress. It has no effect upon the
transactions of individual citizens and has been so
interpreted.”17 The Court also stated that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not regulate individual conduct, so that the

15. The United States National Bank of Portland (Oregon) was the trustee
under the will, and brought the lawsuit against the decedent’s married daughter. It
sought a declaratory judgment to ensure that the trust had been set up properly,
and the interpretations made correctly. United States Nat’l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275
P.2d 860, 861 (Or. 1954). It sought a declaratory judgment to ensure that the trust
had been set up properly, and the interpretations made correctly. Id.
16. Id. at 862. The relevant part of the will stated:
When my said daughter shall have attained the age of thirty-two years and
upon my death, that is to say, when these two events occur, my trustee is
authorized and directed to transfer, assign and/or pay over to my said
daughter Merle the whole of the trust fund of Fifteen Thousand
($15,000.00) Dollars, or the one-half (1/2) of the entire estate if sum is more
than Thirty Thousand ($30,000.00) Dollars, provided she shall have proved
conclusively to my trustee and to its entire satisfaction that she has not
embraced, nor become a member of, the Catholic faith nor ever married to
a man of such faith.
Id. The will provided that if Merle became “ineligible to receive the trust,” the
money would go to other family members. Id.
17. Id. at 866.
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amendments “in no way bear on a transaction of the character
now before us.”18 Furthermore, the Court distinguished the
present case from Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),19
interpreting Shelley narrowly to be:
authority only for the proposition that the enforcement
by state courts of a covenant in a deed restricting the
use and occupancy of real property to persons of the
Caucasian race falls within the purview of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a violation of the equal
protection clause, but, said the court, “That
Amendment [Fourteenth] erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.”20
Courts have decided similarly for wills revoking gifts of
beneficiaries who should “marry a person not born in the
Hebrew faith”21 or for offering a bequest only if a beneficiary
marries “a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish”22 within
seven years of the testator’s death.23
These decisions are correct. In Shelley, the Court issued an
order to enforce the racial covenant and affirmatively compelled
the Shelley family to vacate their home.24 In these restraints on
marriage cases, the courts are not ordering the beneficiaries to
never marry.25 Furthermore, to argue that the facilitation of

18. Id. (“Neither does the Fourteenth Amendment relate to individual
conduct.”)
19. In Shelley, the Supreme Court ruled that it would be unconstitutional for a
state court to enforce restrictive covenants against occupancy or ownership of
property by African Americans. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).
20. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 866 (citing Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23).
21. Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Mass. 1955).
22. Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974).
23. Id. at 827—28 (holding that while
[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very
existence and survival . . . [that] [i]n the case at bar, this court is not being
asked to enforce any restriction upon Daniel Jacob Shapira's constitutional
right to marry. Rather, this court is being asked to enforce the testator's
restriction upon his son's inheritance. If the facts and circumstances of this
case were such that the aid of this court were sought to enjoin Daniel's
marrying a non-Jewish girl, then the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer would
be applicable, but not, it is believed, upon the facts as they are.).
24. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4, 6.
25. See, e.g., Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 827 (“In the case at bar, this court is not
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probate is subject to all Fourteenth Amendment restrictions
would automatically invalidate any testamentary donation to
religious organizations by private individuals. This would be an
absurd result. Constitutionality is a poor way to challenge
restraints on marriage because they are almost certainly
constitutional. Most courts have turned, instead, to a test of
“reasonableness”.
B. WHAT IT MEANS FOR A MARITAL RESTRAINT TO BE
REASONABLE
Complete restraints of marriage—restraints that prohibit the
beneficiary from marrying any person ever—are considered per
se “unreasonable”, and thus void.26 However, partial restraints
may be valid and “not contrary to public policy”27 if they impose
“only reasonable restrictions.”28 Not every court applies the
Reasonableness Test,29 but many do.30
being asked to enforce any restriction upon Daniel Jacob Shapira’s constitutional
right to marry. Rather, this court is being asked to enforce the testator’s restriction
upon his son’s inheritance.”).
26. Id. at 829 (“If the condition were that the beneficiary not marry anyone, the
restraint would be general or total, and, at least in the case of a first marriage,
would be held to be contrary to public policy and void.”).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 1, at 34.
30. See, e.g., Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 234 (Mass. 1955)
(It is generally held in this country that partial restraints on marriage are
valid unless unreasonable. Am.Law of Property, § 27.15; Scott on Trusts, §
62.6; Restatement: Property, § 425; 122 A.L.R. 7. Thus testamentary gifts
conditioned on the beneficiary not marrying a specified individual have
been upheld. Turner v. Evans, 134 Md. 238, 241, 106 A. 617; Graydon's
Executors v. Graydon, 23 N.J.Eq. 229, 237-238; Matter of Seaman's Will, 218
N.Y. 77, 81, 112 N.E. 576, L.R.A.1917A, 40; In re Osborne's Petition, 21
Pa.Dist. & Co. R., 293, 295. A similar result has been reached where the
condition was against marrying into a named family. Phillips v. Ferguson,
85 Va. 509, 513, 8 S.E. 241, 1 L.R.A. 837.);
see also In re Harris' Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1955)
(Conditions in general restraint of marriage were regarded at common law
as contrary to public policy, and therefore void. . . . However, conditions in
partial restraint of marriage, which merely impose reasonable restrictions
upon marriage, are not against public policy. Whether a condition in
restraint of marriage is reasonable depends, not upon the form of the
condition, but upon its purpose and effect under the circumstances of the
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An example of a partial restraint can be found in Gordon v.
Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1955), where the decedent’s will
provided:
If any of my said children shall marry a person not
born in the Hebrew faith then I hereby revoke the gift
or gifts and the provision or provisions herein made to
or for such child, and I direct that the portion or
portions of my estate, and the interest or interests
therein which I have by this will given to such child so
marrying a person not born in the Hebrew faith shall be
paid and made over to that person or persons who
would have been entitled thereto under this will if such
beneficiary had died before becoming entitled by the
provisions hereof to such portion or portions, interest
or interests, without leaving lawful issue.31
In Gordon, the beneficiary in question married a woman
whose parents were Roman Catholic, but after the testator’s
death, she “undertook religious instruction under rabbis . . .
became a convert to Judaism and received a certificate
recognizing her conversion [and] went through a rabbinical
ceremony of marriage.”32 However, the Court affirmed the trial
judge’s finding that at the time of marriage, the wife “was not in
any sense Jewish or Hebrew and it could not then be said that
she was born in the Hebrew faith.”33
Furthermore, the Court found that the restraint was
reasonable, noting that the
particular case.);
Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 827; 6 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE
LAW OF WILLS § 44.25 (Rev. Ed. 2005); 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 118 (2011); United
States Nat’l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 866 (Or. 1954); In re Silverstein’s Will,
155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1956); Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 99 A. 672, 675
(Md. 1916); Jeremy Macklin, The Puzzling Case of Max Feinberg: An Analysis of
Conditions in Partial Restraint of Marriage, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 265, 271 (2009) (“A
partial restraint is subject to a reasonableness test; the restraint will be ‘valid or
invalid according to whether it is reasonable or unreasonable.’” (quoting E.
LeFevre, Annotation, Validity of Provisions of Will or Deed Prohibiting, Penalizing, or
Requiring Marriage to One of a Particular Religious Faith, 50 A.L.R. 2D 740, § 2 at 740
(1956))).
31. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 230.
32. Id.
33. Id. (The court also insisted that “born in the Jewish faith” referred to the
ordinary sense of the word “born”, not the spiritual sense.)
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only American case which might be said to hold a
testamentary condition against marrying outside a
certain religion to be unreasonable could rest on the
ground that in the circumstances the restriction of the
beneficiary’s choice of spouse to the Society of Friends
would operate as a complete prohibition of marriage.34
The Court did not expand much further on the
“reasonableness” analysis beyond this distinction.35 Similarly,
other cases use the Reasonableness Test with little to no
explanation as to why it is preferred.36
Restatement (Second) of Property reflects this in that, “[t]he
restraint unreasonably limits the transferee’s opportunity to
marry if a marriage permitted by the restraint is not likely to
occur. The likelihood of marriage is a factual question, to be
answered from the circumstances of the particular case.”37
The test of “reasonableness” becomes, then, a temporal and
geographical test of how many viable marriage candidates are
accessible to the beneficiary.38 For example, the Gordon Court
34. Id. at 234.
35. Id.
(The contention is made that a restriction conditioned upon the religious
faith of the parents of the prospective wife at the time of her birth is
unreasonable. The question is not whether the testator used good
judgment in including paragraph 14 in his will or whether we should
approve or disapprove his action. What we have to decide is whether he
was prevented from doing as he did by any rule of law. We are unable to
discover that he was.)
36. See, e.g., In re Rosenthal’s Estate, 123 N.Y.S.2d 326, 333 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1953)
(noting that “conditions in partial restraint of marriage, which merely impose
reasonable restrictions upon marriage, are not against public policy.” (quoting
Matter of Liberman, 18 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1939))); In re Harris’ Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 746,
748 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1955) (holding valid a provision for the distribution of the corpus
of a trust after the death of the life beneficiary, which stipulated that any beneficiary
“at the time of my death be married to any person born or begotten of parents other
than of the Hebrew religion and faith”, id., will not receive the bequest.); In re Weil’s
Estate, 124 Misc. 692, 695 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1925) aff'd sub nom. In the Matter of Weil,
213 N.Y.S. 933 (1926) (“On the other hand, however, a clause in special restraint of
marriage, such as prohibition of marriage to a person outside of a particular faith,
or to a designated person, is in the ordinary course valid.”).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a (1983).
38. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of
Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273,
1319—20 (1999)
(When considering partial restraints on marriage, courts often, though not
consistently, direct their attention not to the arbitrariness of a restraint's
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noted:
Joseph Gordon was an orthodox Jew, and his children
were brought up in the tenets of that faith. About 50
Jewish families lived in the city of Attleboro and the
town of North Attleboro. There was an orthodox
synagogue in Attleboro. Harold was not limited in the
choice of a wife to a resident of that city.39
The court in Shapira v. Union National Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825,
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974) conducted a similar analysis:
[C]ounsel for the plaintiff asserts that the number of
eligible Jewish females in this county would be an
extremely small minority of the total population
especially as compared with the comparatively much
greater number in New York, whence have come many
of the cases comprising the weight of authority
upholding the validity of such clauses. There are no
census figures in evidence. While this court could
probably take judicial notice of the fact that the Jewish
community is a minor, though important segment of
our total local population, nevertheless the court is by
no means justified in judicial knowledge that there is an
insufficient number of eligible young ladies of Jewish
parentage in this area from which Daniel would have a
reasonable latitude of choice. And of course, Daniel is
not at all confined in his choice to residents of this
county, which is a very different circumstance in this
day of travel by plane and freeway and communication
by telephone, from the horse and buggy days.40
Thus, judges who apply the Reasonableness Test have to
operate as generalists in the extremity. They must determine not
only issues of law, but also the number and availability of
compatible companions for the beneficiary.

content but to the extent of its reach. If a will conditions a bequest on the
legatee's marrying a certain kind of person, and if the number of
‘qualifying’ potential spouses in the legatee's geographic area is so small
that it would be difficult if not impossible for the legatee to secure such a
spouse, the condition will be held void because, in operation, it amounts to
a virtual prohibition of marriage. But if the number of qualifying potential
spouses is high enough, the condition will be upheld as a reasonable
partial restraint.).
39. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 230.
40. Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 831 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974).
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III. FOUR MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THE REASONABLENESS TEST
A. QUESTIONING THE TESTATOR’S JUDGMENT
It is insincere to claim, on the one hand, that it is not within
the purview of the court to question whether the testator used
good judgment in structuring the provisions of his will,41 but on
the other hand, judging the “reasonableness” of that provision.
In fact, courts are very careful to highlight this distinction by
explicitly stating, in the opinion, that the question is not whether
the testator used good judgment.42
In reality, the courts are making judgments about the
testator’s judgment. When a testator’s explicit restraint is
pronounced “unreasonable”—so “unreasonable” that the court
refuses to enforce it—that pronouncement is in of itself a
statement about the testator’s judgment. The effect of the
Reasonableness Test is that testators—regardless of what their
actual intention is—cannot condition gifts on marital conditions
that are not likely to exist.
Suppose a testator writes a will that states, “I give
everything to Daughter if she is accepted to Harvard University;
otherwise, I give everything to charity.” Even if the condition is
very unlikely to be fulfilled—that is, Daughter has bad grades
and test scores—it is unlikely that this provision would be struck
down for public policy reasons. The testator is free to distribute
his money based on whatever conditions he desires, regardless
of the probability that the condition will be fulfilled.
41. See, e.g., id. at 832. (“His unmistakable testamentary plan was that his
possessions be used to encourage the preservation of the Jewish faith and blood,
hopefully through his sons, but, if not, then through the State of Israel. Whether this
judgment was wise is not for this court to determine.”).
42. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 234 (“The question is not whether the testator used
good judgment in including paragraph 14 in his will or whether we should approve
or disapprove his action.”); Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 832 (“His unmistakable
testamentary plan was that his possessions be used to encourage the preservation of
the Jewish faith and blood, hopefully through his sons, but, if not, then through the
State of Israel. Whether this judgment was wise is not for this court to determine.”).
This language notwithstanding, the courts in both Gordon and Shapira proceeded to
analyze the reasonableness of the wills’ provisions, as discussed supra Section II.B.
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Given the general emphasis on respecting the testator’s
intent,43 why are marital restraints the exception? If a testator
wishes to condition a gift on an event that has a low probability
of occurring, as in the Harvard example, the gift, on its face,
does not contravene public policy. Thus, there is very little
support for why—in the cases of marital restraints—the courts
and the Restatement determine that gifts conditioned on an
unlikely event always violate public policy.44
B. EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE FACTUAL QUESTION OF
REASONABLENESS
The Reasonableness Test is questionable not only as an
issue of law, but it is also problematic as applied. As applied,
“reasonableness” is a factual test.45 This puts judges in the
position of estimating the probability that a marriage permitted
by the restraint will occur. For example, the court in Shapira
admitted that there was “no census figures in evidence.”46
However, it went on to speculate the sufficiency of the “number
of eligible young ladies of Jewish parentage in this area from
which [the plaintiff] would have a reasonable latitude of
choice.”47
The first empirical problem with the factual inquiry is that it
is by no means clear that judges are equipped, or that they
ought, to estimate the racial or cultural make-up of the
beneficiary’s city. Professor Sherman has argued that courts
don’t even conduct this analysis “although it is easy enough to
find courts willing at least to pay lip service to this distinction
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
10.1 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a
donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to
the maximum extent allowed by law.” (emphasis added)).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 37—40.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a (1983)
(“A restraint unreasonably limits the transferee’s opportunity to marry if a marriage
permitted by the restraint is not likely to occur. The likelihood of marriage is a
factual question, to be answered from the circumstances of the particular case.”)
46. Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 831.
47. Id.
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between reasonable and unreasonable partial restraints.”48
The bigger problem is that geographic census data is a
sloppy proxy for the actual issue in question—the likelihood of
marriage. Merely because a city has a sizeable population of
eligible spouses does not mean that this population contains
members that would actually be willing to marry the
beneficiary, even if the beneficiary is willing. The population of
eligible spouses is only one of many factors in determining the
likelihood of marriage—other factors include social skills, level
of education and income, age, and physical attractiveness.49
There is also a persistent social myth that older women are more
likely to be killed by a terrorist than to get married.50 If there is
any truth to this myth at all, it follows that any marital restraint
on a female beneficiary over 40-years old is “unreasonable”.
If courts genuinely want to calculate the likelihood of a
permissive marriage, they need to consider the above facts as
well. Otherwise, it is not clear why geographic population
should be the chosen proxy for likelihood of marriage. It would
be inappropriate, and possibly offensive, for courts to make a
genuine effort at figuring out the factual question of likelihood
of marriage. However, this does not mean that automatically
presuming that geographic census data—or a speculative
estimation
thereof—is
an
appropriate
proxy
for
“reasonableness.”

48. Sherman, supra note 38, at 1321.
49. There is a wealth of literature in both scholarship and popular media
speculating on the factors that make marriage more likely. See generally Lloyd
Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life”,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987). There are also prominent social theories about the
affect of age on likelihood of marriage, especially for older women. See, e.g., Tara
Parker-Pope, Marriage and Women Over 40, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010,
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/marriage-and-women-over-40/.
50. See, e.g., THE HOLIDAY (Columbia/Universal Pictures 2006) (“Single women
over the age of 35 are more likely to be killed by a terrorist than get married.”);
ADDICTED TO HIS LOVE (Green/Epstein Productions 1988) (“A woman at 40 is more
likely to get shot by a terrorist than get married.”); SLEEPLESS IN SEATTLE (TriStar
Pictures 1993) (“It’s easier to be killed by a terrorist than it is to find a husband over
the age of 40!”).
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C. FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ACTUAL INFLUENCE ON
BENEFICIARY
The court in Shapira, in declining to invalidate the marital
condition provision of the decedent’s will, held that the
beneficiary “is no more being ‘blackmailed into a marriage by
immediate financial gain,’ as suggested by counsel, than would
be the beneficiary of a living gift or conveyance upon
consideration of a future marriage—an arrangement which has
long been sanctioned by the courts of this state.”51 Of course, the
Court was correct in one aspect: there was no blackmail in this
case.
Blackmail, by definition, is the crime of threatening to
reveal embarrassing, disgraceful, or damaging facts or rumors
about a person unless paid off not to carry out the threat.52 In
Shapira, the provision in the will was not threatening to take the
plaintiff’s money if he did not comply with the restraint; rather,
it was threatening to withhold a gratuitous gift.53 As the Court
noted, it “is a fundamental rule of law in Ohio that a testator
may legally entirely disinherit his children.”54
In other words, the plaintiff had no entitlement, or right, to
the decedent’s money in the first place, so the threat of
withholding the gift is not blackmail. Notably, however, this is
true of any condition that withholds the gift, whether or not the
condition is “reasonable”, there is a massive, willing, and eager
population of permitted potential spouses in the plaintiff’s
vicinity, and the plaintiff has a slim chance of marrying the
decedent’s choice.
51. Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 832.
52. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 192 (9th ed. 2009). Perhaps the counsel quoted
by the Shapira court chose to use the term “blackmail” rhetorically and did not
intend for it to be taken as an actual legal argument. However, the Court chose to
quote it and explicitly rejected the notion as wrong.
53. See Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 831 – 32.
54. Id. at 828. Ohio is not unique. As a matter of fact, in “all states except
Louisiana, a child or other descendant has no statutory protection against
intentional disinheritance by a parent. There is no requirement that a testator leave
any property to a child, not even the proverbial one dollar.” DUKEMINIER, ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 519.
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Even if we do not go so far as to say that the provision is
invalidated on grounds of blackmail—even if we merely
disallow marital restraint provisions because public policy
favors freedom of choice for marriage55—the question becomes
whether the marital restraint actually restricts the beneficiary’s
freedom of choice of marriage. It, almost certainly, does not.56
For example, if someone offers another fifty dollars to wear a red
shirt, he is certainly not infringing on the other’s freedom to
wear a shirt of any other color. The provision in the will is
similar—it is an inducement, not an order.
D. INCONSISTENT RESULTS
As discussed in Section III.A.3, supra¸ “reasonableness” is
applied as a factual test. “[A] restraint unreasonably limits the
transferee’s opportunity to marry if a marriage permitted by the
restraint is not likely to occur. The likelihood of marriage is a
factual question, to be answered from the circumstances of the
particular case.”57 This has been noted as an ostensibly arbitrary
test that yields inconsistent and somewhat counter-intuitive
results. As Professor Sherman points out:
[T]he approach seems unprincipled in that its results
turn on the fortuities of geographic and demographic
factors. By this reasoning, a bequest conditioned on the
legatee’s marrying a Jewish person stands more likely
to be upheld in New York than in Wyoming, and a
bequest conditioned on the legatee’s marrying a
Christian probably could withstand attack everywhere
in the country, while a bequest conditioned on the
legatee’s marrying a Taoist probably could not survive
anywhere.58
In addition to the problems discussed by Professor
Sherman, is the need to consider the future plans of the

55. See, e.g., Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 829.
56. There is perhaps one exception, if one subscribes to the notion of economic
coercion. See supra Section III.B.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a (1983).
58. Sherman, supra note 38, at 1320—21.
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beneficiary. For example, if the testator conditioned his gift on
the beneficiary marrying a Jewish person who lives in New
York, but the beneficiary decided to move to Wyoming the
Reasonableness Test would turn on these plans. However, this
severely destroys the consistency of the analyses across cases.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MARITAL RESTRAINTS
Given the shortcomings of the Reasonableness Test, 59 the
apparent task is to find a suitable replacement. The general
options are to (A) prohibit all marital restraints, (B) allow all
marital restraints, (C) balance the public policy factors on a caseby-case basis, or (D) prescribe a new test.
A. PROHIBITING ALL MARITAL RESTRAINTS (SHERMAN)
Although, when it comes to testamentary writings, there is
a general emphasis on the testator’s intent,60 Professor Sherman
has argued that testation is only allowed to the extent “to avoid
the harms that the abolition of testation would produce. To
avoid those harms it is crucial to allow property owners to
designate their successors, but it is not necessary to allow them
also to superintend their successors’ behavior.”61
The following logic would
invalidate all testamentary conditions calculated to
restrain or induce particular personal conduct on the
part of the legatees, even if the conduct in question has
nothing to do with marriage or religion and even if the
conduct sought to be induced is “good” or the conduct
sought to be restrained is “bad”.62
To Professor Sherman, “even if under a testamentary
59. See supra Sections III.A.1—3 (discussing the shortcomings and problems of
the reasonableness test).
60. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a
donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to
the maximum extent allowed by law.” (emphasis added)).
61. Sherman, supra note 38, at 1329.
62. Id.
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condition the class of permissible spouses includes all human
beings except one, the condition should be held invalid.”63 As a
result, he proposes a “blanket rule invalidating all testamentary
restraints that condition bounty on the legatee’s ‘proper’ choice
of spouse[.] . . . [This rule] is simpler and more predictable in its
application, and more principled in its foundation.”64 Sherman’s
proposition would invalidate not only marital restraint
provisions, but also all testator attempts at behavior-shaping.65
B. ALLOWING ALL MARITAL RESTRAINTS (TESTATOR’S INTENT)
Restatement (Third) of Property states that “[t]he
controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a
donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s
intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”66
Following this line of thought, Professor Kreiczer-Levy has
noted that:
[t]estamentary freedom is a pivotal value in the AngloAmerican legal tradition. The property owner is
conceived as holding the power to make free choices
regarding the allocation of his property after death.
63. Id. at 1322.
64. Id. (emphasis added). See also Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Religiously Inspired
Gender-Bias Disinheritance—What’s Law Got To Do With It?, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV.
669, 689 (2010). Although Kreiczer-Levy, unlike Sherman, does not argue for the
flat-out prohibition on marital restraint provisions, she does note in her analysis
that as a general matter, it is important to figure out
whether disinheriting a woman because she is a woman, following a
religious belief, indeed demeans her. First of all, it is hardly controversial
that women as a group have a history of mistreatment. Now, the next step
would be to assess the meaning of the act of disinheritance from the estate.
This brings us back to our former discussion of inheritance as reaffirming a
child's position in the family. The law in British Columbia and New
Zealand suggests that occasionally a decision to disinherit a child would
be unacceptable. There is a moral perception that is backed by social
expectations that inheritance says something about the relationship
between the child and the parent, that inheritance means something about
a child's path in life, and that inheritance means something about the
child's position in the family.
Id.
65. Sherman, supra note 38, at 1329.
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
10.1 (2003) (emphasis added).
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Inheritance law is thus usually conceived, almost
intuitively, as part of the testator’s prerogative. A
massive part of the law naturally flows from this basic
fact. Reviewing the case law, testamentary freedom in
one form or another, is frequently assumed. In other
words, the testator is at the focus of inheritance both in
theory and in practice. The freedom to choose one’s
receivers is even more expansive and includes the
testator’s ability to control his receivers’ lives through
making conditions or by creating a trust.
Testamentary freedom also points to an easy solution to
our dilemma, an opposite one to forced heirship rules.
The testator is free to disinherit his daughters on
whatever grounds he sees fit. He can disinherit her
even out of pure spite or vindictive spirit. Why then
should the law interfere with a religiously inspired
motive, even considering it is gender-bias? The testator
is not bound by the principle of equality.67
The testator-intent-centered argument, of allowing all
marital restraint provisions, is bolstered by the fact that “[i]n all
states except Louisiana, a child or other descendant has no
statutory protection against intentional disinheritance by a
parent. There is no requirement that a testator leave any
property to a child, not even the proverbial one dollar.”68 Thus,
there is a fairly strong argument that because decedents enjoy
the right to withhold all gifts from potential beneficiaries,
conditional gifts are but a subset of this general right.
C. CASE BY CASE BALANCING (FEINBERG II)
In the recent Feinberg II case, the Supreme Court of Illinois

67. Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 64, at 686. Notably, although Kreiczer-Levy
summarizes the testator intent argument very well, she proposes a different
approach. Id. at 686—87
(This is indeed a strong argument. I suggest a different one. Inheritance
law can, through the public policy doctrine, invalidate such a provision. I
do not argue the law should immediately endorse such a rule. My goal
here is much more modest. I show that the question is intricate, and
requires some deliberation. I strive to show that even in a country that
does not directly protect the family, it does not mean that any
disinheritance is automatically morally accepted.).
68. DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 1, at 519.
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was faced with a will provision that stated,69
[a] descendant of mine other than a child of mine who
marries outside the Jewish faith (unless the spouse of
such descendant has converted or converts within one
year of the marriage to the Jewish faith) and his or her
descendants shall be deemed to be deceased for all
purposes of this instrument as of the date of such
marriage.70
In Feinberg I, the Illinois Court of Appeals had voided the
provision, ruling that “[t]he condition is an invalid restraint on
marriage.”71 Although the Feinberg I majority did not apply the
Reasonableness Test the concurring and dissenting opinions did,
with differing results. The Feinberg I concurrence held that the
restraint was considered unreasonable in modern times.72 The
Feinberg I dissenting opinion found that the restraint was
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the
reasonable.73
invalidation of the provision, without articulating the
Reasonableness Test; instead, it weighed the public policy
concerns of freedom of testation against terms regarding
marriage and divorce.74
69. Technically, the provision was written as a condition for a conditional
trust. However, the actual marital restraint was adopted by the decedent’s wife’s
will, which was at issue in the case. Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d 888, 902 (Ill. 2009)
(The validity of a trust provision is not at issue, as the distribution
provision of Max's trust was revoked when Erla exercised her power of
appointment. Her distribution scheme was in the nature of a testamentary
provision, which operated at the time of her death to determine who
would be entitled to a $250,000 distribution.).
70. Feinberg I, 891 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
71. Id. at 552.
72. Id. at 555 (Quinn, J., concurring) (“While the Restatement (First) and
(Second) of Trusts explained that restraints such as the instant ‘Jewish Clause’ were
once considered reasonable, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts now provides that
they are no longer reasonable.”).
73. Id. at 558 (Greiman, J., dissenting )
(Accordingly, the great weight of authority as to cases which have
considered this subject have held such provisions as it appears in the case
at bar to be reasonable and not contrary to the state's public policy. The
majority places us in the minority of jurisdictions that have considered this
issue.).
74. Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d at 894 (“When we determine that our answer to a
question of law must be based on public policy, it is not our role to make such
policy. Rather, we must discern the public policy of the state of Illinois as
expressed in the constitution, statutes, and long-standing case law.”).
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The Feinberg II court ruled, on the one hand, that the public
policy of the state of Illinois is “one of broad testamentary
freedom, constrained only by the rights granted to a surviving
spouse and the need to expressly disinherit a child born after
execution of the will if that is the testator’s desire.”75 On the
other hand, it stated that there is a “long-standing rule that
conditions annexed to a gift that have the tendency to induce
spouses to divorce . . . are void on grounds of public policy.”76
Looking to the facts, the Feinberg II court found that the
provision
does not implicate the principle that trust provisions
that encourage divorce violate public policy . . .
[because it was not] “capable of exerting . . . a
disruptive influence upon an otherwise normally
harmonious marriage” by causing the beneficiary to
choose between his or her spouse and the
distribution . . . [because the provision] involves the
decision to marry, not an incentive to divorce.77
Furthermore, the Feinberg II court noted that it had
“considered the validity of restrictions affecting marriage in
cases going back as far as 1857.”78
This is notably not an application of the classical
Reasonableness Test—the Feinberg II court made no effort to
answer the factual question of how many eligible spouses live in
the city.79 Instead, the court balanced the policy factors—
75. Id. at 895.
76. Id. at 897. See also Orly Henry, If You Will It, It Is No Dream: Balancing Public
Policy and Testamentary Freedom, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 215, 216 (2011)
(Public policy in Illinois is to support, encourage, and safeguard the
institution of marriage, and to promote marital harmony where possible.
However, the state of Illinois also supports broad testamentary freedom,
meaning that testators are generally given wide latitude to do as they
please within the limits of the law and the state's public policy.
(citing Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d at 897 & 895, respectively)).
77. Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d at 899 (quoting In re Gerbing’s Estate, 377 N.E.2d 29,
33 (Ill. 1975) (omission in original)).
78. Id.
79. Contra RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a
(1983) (“[A] restraint unreasonably limits the transferee’s opportunity to marry if a
marriage permitted by the restraint is not likely to occur. The likelihood of
marriage is a factual question, to be answered from the circumstances of the
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testamentary freedom and discouragement of marriage.80
D. ALTERNATIVE TESTS
As an alternative to (A) prohibiting all marital restraints, (B)
allowing all marital restraints, and (C) ad hoc case-by-case
balancing, this article suggest a new test. The new test should
offer advantages beyond those of the other alternative methods,
as well as address the problems inherent in the Reasonableness
Test. This article intends to do just that in its offer of the
Coercion Test. The next section will discuss the new test, and
the advantages of the new test over the first three options.
V. THE COERCION TEST AND ITS ADVANTAGES
If the freedom of choice of marriage is a great enough public
policy reason to curtail the testator’s intent, which it appears to
be,81 then the testator’s intent should be circumvented only when
that freedom is threatened. The Reasonableness Test fails to
address this—it is both over and under inclusive. The reader
should consider a new test that measures the actual influence that
the provision has on the beneficiary. This new test will be called
the Coercion Test, which invalidates a will provision only when
the court finds that it is coercive.
A. THE TEST FOR COERCION
In a testamentary restraint on marriage the testator
particular case.”)
80. Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d at 894.
81. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the
meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is
given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.” (emphasis added)). See also Henry,
supra note 76, at 216
(Beneficiary restriction clauses and other similar testamentary provisions
can present an issue of public policy because these clauses may be
disruptive to marital harmony, whether or not the testator intended such
an effect. These clauses can be construed as coercive, forcing potential
beneficiaries to choose between an inheritance and a love that does not
meet the conditions of the clause.).
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threatens to withhold a gratuitous gift, not harm the beneficiary.
Can this ever amount to coercion? Perhaps the closest analogy
can be found in the academic literature concerning coercive
wage offers.
Since the controversy is longstanding in
contemporary western economies, a thorough discussion is
beyond the scope of this article. However, the general question
is whether, “the wage bargain in a capitalist labor market [is]
coercive if the worker is limited to a choice between unpalatable
alternatives, for example, working at a low-paying job and
starving?”82
This question is analogous to the issue in this article,
because the analysis is the same, replacing the “low-paying job”
with an “undesirable marriage.” In both cases, the party
holding the money has no obligation to pay the beneficiary, but
chooses to condition the payment on the beneficiary doing
something he would rather not. Some argue that when the
beneficiary is in a time of true economic distress, coercion
exists.83 Others entertain a narrower conception of coercion.84
For example if,
Z is faced with working or starving; the choices and
actions of all other persons do not add up to providing
Z with some other option. . . . Does Z choose to work
voluntarily? (Does someone on a desert island who
must work to survive?) Z does choose voluntarily if
the other individuals A through Y each acted
voluntarily and within their rights. . . . A person’s
choice among differing degrees of unpalatable
alternatives is not rendered nonvoluntary by the fact
that others voluntarily chose and acted within their
rights in a way that did not provide him with a more
palatable alternative.85
82. David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121, 121
(1981).
83. See, e.g., C. B. MACPHERSON, Elegant Tombstones: A Note on Friedman’s
Freedom, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 143, 146 (1973) (noting that
“the existence of a labour force without its own sufficient capital [is] . . . therefore
without a choice as to whether to put its labour in the market or not.” (emphasis
added)).
84. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 263—64 (1974).
85. Id. (emphasis added). Nozick also gives the following example: “Suppose
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Others have argued that this emphasis on prior rights and
wrongs is misplaced, that instead, “wage proposals generally do
count as genuine offers, because workers generally do want to
make the move from actual pre-proposal situations . . . to the
proposal situations capitalists make available.”86 Therefore, an
offer is “coercive if and only if (1) an alternative pre-proposal
situation workers would strongly prefer to the actual one is
technologically and economically feasible when the offer is
made, and (2) capitalists prevent workers from having at least
one of these feasible alternative pre-proposal situations.”87 An
example of this is if a beneficiary is kidnapped, brought to an
island where there is only one factory, and he has to work there
in order not to starve. This is a case where the beneficiary is
actively prevented “from being in the alternative pre-proposal
situation [he] strongly prefers.”88 Yet, another view is that an
offer of money is coercive if the beneficiary’s “dependency and
need”89 is exploited.90
This has only been a brief glimpse at the arguments about
wage coercion, but it gives us some elementary tools with which
to approach the marital restraint problem. Conditional offers of
money are only coercive in very specific, and limited situations
where “not helping is just as bad as harming.”91 Most of the
literature agrees that coercion requires—at the minimum—that
the coerced party is in a situation of economic distress, which is

there are twenty-six women and twenty-six men each wanting to be married. For
each sex, all of that sex agree on the same ranking of the twenty-six members of the
opposite sex in terms of desirability as marriage partners.” Id. at 263. The most
desirable woman will marry the most desirable man. Id. When the second most
desirable man marries the second most desirable woman, “their choices are not
made nonvoluntary merely by the fact that there is something else they each would
rather do. This other most preferred option requires the cooperation of others who
have chosen, as is their right, not to cooperate.” Id. (emphasis added).
86. Zimmerman, supra note 82, at 144.
87. Id. at 144—45.
88. Id. at 133 (emphasis removed).
89. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 33 (1988).
90. Id.
91. Zimmerman, supra note 82, at 135.
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exploited.92 Others require substantively more than exploitation
in that “the person who does the coercing [must] undermine[], or
limit[] the freedom of the person who is coerced.”93
A different approach—one that does not focus on economic
need—is given by a very recent empirical study, which found
that 82% of respondents felt that an offer of payment is coercive
if the offer of payment causes them to feel that they have no
reasonable alternative but to participate.94 This modern account
is not an entire departure from the academic theories; if the
induced party feels enough economic need, it follows that he
will consider there to be no reasonable alternatives.
At the very least, though, the consensus is that if a will
provision is coercive, it must require the coerced party be in a
situation economically desperate enough to choose the
unpalatable choice, or otherwise have no alternative. Any less,
and there is no coercion, and no limitation on the beneficiary’s
freedom.
B. ADVANTAGES OF THE COERCION TEST OVER ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES
1. PROHIBITING ALL MARITAL RESTRAINTS VERSUS THE
COERCION TEST
The argument for prohibiting all marital restraints assumes
that testation is only allowed “to the extent necessary to avoid
the harms that the abolition of testation would produce.”95
However, this approach seems somewhat at odds with the
testator’s ability to completely disinherit.96
A blanket
92. See, e.g., Macpherson, supra note 83, at 146; FRANKFURT, supra note 89, at 33.
93. Zimmerman, supra note 82, at 134.
94. Emily A. Largent, et al., Money, Coercion, and Undue Inducement: Attitudes
about Payments to Research Participants, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Jan.—Feb. 2012, at
Table 3.
95. Sherman, supra note 38, at 1329.
96. DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 1, at 519 (As a matter of fact, “[i]n all states
except Louisiana, a child or other descendant has no statutory protection against
intentional disinheritance by a parent. There is no requirement that a testator leave
any property to a child, not even the proverbial one dollar.”).
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prohibition on all marital restraints would put testators (who
know the law) in the position of deciding whether it would be
better to completely disinherit his child, out of anticipation that
the child will not marry someone suitable, or give an
unconditional gift. This seems like an extremely uncomfortable
position.
Sherman’s main concern, in promulgating the blanket
prohibition approach, is opposition to excessive dead-hand
control. According to Sherman, “it is not necessary to allow
[testators] . . . to superintend their successors’ behavior.”97
Sherman also notes that “it’s nearly time we had a little less
respect for the dead, an’ a little more regard for the livin’.”98 The
beauty of the Coercion Test is that it should not arouse Professor
Sherman’s concerns about dead-hand control, because the crux
of the Coercion Test is ensuring that the living beneficiaries are
not coerced into changing their behavior.99 If a provision is
found to be coercive, it would be invalidated under the Coercion
Test. Thus, the Coercion Test will result in similar “regard” for
the living, as a blanket prohibition on all marital restraints, but
also pay more homage to testator intent.
2. ALLOWING ALL MARITAL RESTRAINTS VERSUS THE COERCION
TEST
There are two obvious problems with allowing all marital
restraints to be enforced. First, it allows the dead-hand an
inordinate amount of power. Allowing all marital restraints is
an unpopular argument because it always places testator intent
over the priorities of the living.100 Second, it disregards any
public policy concerns. Courts have long held that provisions
contrary to public policy should be voided.101
97. Sherman, supra note 38, at 1329.
98. Id. at 1330 (quoting SEAN O’CASEY, Juno and the Paycock, in THREE PLAYS 49
(1968)).
99. See supra Section V.A.
100. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 38, at 1329.
101. Almost all marital restraint cases consider public policy as a value that is
important enough to offset testator intent. See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315
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First, the Coercion Test properly limits the dead-hand in
situations where it tries to coerce the living. In situations where
the living is not coerced by the provision, the dead-hand has no
power. There is no need to fear the dead-hand in situations
where it has no power over the living.
Second, the Coercion Test is built on the crux of the public
policy concern for freedom of choice of marriage. This means
that, unlike a blanket allowance on all marital restraints, it will
take the public policy concern of freedom of choice of marriage
into account and void provisions that harm this interest.
3. CASE-BY-CASE BALANCING VERSUS THE COERCION TEST
This case-by-case balancing approach offers some of the
benefits that the Reasonableness Test does not offer. Most
notably, it does not yield the absurdities or legal inconsistencies
discussed in Sections III.A.1—3, supra. However, some have
argued that the Illinois Supreme Court’s case-by-case balancing
approach in “Feinberg does not provide clear guidance because
the court carefully narrowed the issue to the facts before it,”102
and that it should “have established a more clear precedent
rather than potentially limiting the precedent established in
Feinberg to the case’s particular facts.”103 This is, essentially, a
complaint about the case-by-case approach. When the court
endeavors to balance the public policies invoked by the facts of a
case, of course their holding will be limited to the case’s
particular facts—this is inevitable.
The Coercion Test would be a less ad-hoc method of
approaching marital restraint provisions than case-by-case

N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974) (“A partial restraint of marriage which
imposes only reasonable restrictions is valid, and not contrary to public policy”); In
re Harris’ Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1955); 6 WILLIAM J. BOWE &
DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 44.25 (Rev. Ed. 2005); 52 AM.
JUR. 2D Marriage § 117 (2011); United States Nat’l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860,
866 (Or. 1954); In re Silverstein’s Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1956);
Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 99 A. 672, 675 (Md. 1916).
102. See Henry, supra note 76, at 236.
103. Id. at 233.

TABLES.FORMATTED.LEE (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/18/2013 11:35 AM

RESTRAINTS ON MARRIAGE

81

balancing. Courts could develop clear factors used to consider
whether the provision is coercive, and they could benefit from
the established literature on economic coercion.104 Therefore, the
Coercion Test would offer the sensitivity to public policy and
testator intent that case-by-case balancing would offer, while
ensuring smoother and more consistent application in courts.
4. REASONABLENESS TEST VERSUS THE COERCION TEST
The Coercion Test avoids many of the pitfalls of the
Reasonableness Test described in Section III.105 First, the
Reasonableness Test perpetuates judgment of testator’s
judgment along with claims that the judgment is based on
“reasonableness”, not the testator’s judgment. But, as discussed
in Section III.A, supra, this is fundamentally duplicitous because
any judgment that the testator’s chosen condition is
“unreasonable” is essentially a conclusion of the testator’s
judgment on what the suitable condition on the gift is. The
Coercion Test circumvents this problem because it shifts the
focus from the “reasonableness” of the donor’s condition, to the
control the provision has over the donor. Under the Coercion
Test, it does not matter what the donor wants—so the donor’s
intention is not judged—rather, what matters is how desperate
or exploited the donee is by the condition.
Second, it would be empirically easier for courts to
determine factors of the Coercion Test than those of the
Reasonableness Test.106 Instead of acting as a census taker and
speculating as to how likely the beneficiary is to attract an
eligible spouse given the local population of women or men, the
court applying the Coercion Test can examine factors like, the
amount of money offered by the will, the economic condition of
the beneficiary, and the alternative options open to the donee.
Much of this evidence will be readily available to the court.
104. See supra Section V.A.
105. See supra Section III.
106. See supra Section III.B (discussing empirical problems with the
reasonableness test).
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The Coercion Test will also provide more consistent results.
Professor Sherman’s concern that the Reasonableness Test’s
“results turn on the fortuities of geographic and demographic
factors”107 will be sufficiently addressed by the Coercion Test.
This is because, in the Coercion Test, the results no longer turn
on the geographic population in the state in which the
beneficiary lives; instead, they turn on the actual pressure the
provision places on the beneficiary.
Lastly, the Coercion Test will attack the crux of the public
policy problem – that the dead shall wrongly restrict the
freedom of choice of marriage of the living. As discussed in
Section III, the Reasonableness Test is both over and under
inclusive in addressing this problem.
Scenario

1

Facts

Reasonableness

Coercion

Test

Test

Background: Son has fallen

Provision

Provision

on hard times and is in

Upheld.

Voided.

Provision

Provision

Upheld.

Upheld.

desperate need of cash for
food and clothes.
Will Provision: I hereby give
Son my fortune of one million
dollars, but only if he marries
a woman of Catholic faith.

2

Background:

Son

makes

enough money to support
himself,
everyone

although
else

—

—

like

would

welcome extra money.
Will Provision: I hereby give
Son my fortune of one million
dollars, but only if he marries
a woman of Catholic faith.

107. Sherman, supra note 38, at 1320—21. See also supra Section III.B.
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Background: Son has fallen

Provision

Provision

on hard times and is in

Voided.

Voided.

Provision

Provision

Voided.

Upheld.

desperate need of cash for
food and clothes.
Will Provision: I hereby give
Son my fortune of one million
dollars, but only if he marries
a woman of Baloch descent.108
4

Background:

Son

makes

enough money to support
himself,
everyone

although
else

—

—

like

would

welcome extra money.
Will Provision: I hereby give
Son my fortune of one million
dollars, but only if he marries
a woman of Baloch descent.

Table 1. Comparing the Reasonableness with Coercion in
Testamentary Restraints on Marriage.

The Coercion Test addresses public policy concerns better
than the Reasonableness Test. Consider Table 1. Table 1 poses
four hypothetical cases, and also whether courts would uphold
the provisions applying tests of reasonableness, as contrasted
with tests of coercion. In Scenarios 2 and 3, the two tests yield
the same result. In Scenarios 1 and 4, the tests yield differing
results. In Scenario 1, Son desperately needs money. Assume
that his situation is bad enough for economic coercion to be a

108. Baloch is a small ethnic group that makes up 2% of the population of
Afghanistan, 2% of the population of Iran, and 3.57% the population of Pakistan.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Jan. 25, 2012),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publicatons/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html. Let
us assume that the beneficiary is living in the United States and has a very small
chance of successfully locating such a woman.
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true threat. Now, no matter how reasonable the provision is—
that is, no longer how likely it is that he will be able to find a
permitted spouse—he will, more or less, be forced to seek out
and marry her if he actually needs the money. In Scenario 4, Son
does not need money so badly that the offer of money would be
considered economic coercion. He is free to decide whether or
not to accept the conditional gift.
If the public policy concern is protecting the freedom of
choice of marriage, it must be that the provision in Scenario 1 is
more harmful than the provision in Scenario 4. Although the
Scenario 4 condition is unreasonable, it in no way infringes upon
Son’s freedom. It might frustrate him to know that he is
foregoing a large fortune because he cannot find a permitted
mate; but, he is no more bound to the marital restraint than any
student who is offered money to do a research project.
In contrast, if Son in Scenario 1 feels that he needs the
money in order to afford the bare requirements of survival, he is
bound to the marital restraint no matter how easy or difficult it
is to carry out. His freedom of choice of marriage is curtailed, no
matter what the condition is. If the balance to be made here is
between the testator’s intent (which is traditionally favored in
the making of wills) and public policy (which centers on
encouraging marriage and freedom of choice thereof), a test of
whether the beneficiary was actually coerced by the will
provision is the better test for courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article began by examining how courts have approached
marital restraint provisions in wills by using the Reasonableness
Test, but finding that it has several fatal shortcomings.
Next, the article discussed possible alternative approaches
to testamentary marital restraints. The four most prominent
approaches were: (1) a blanket prohibition of all marital
restraints, most noticeably promulgated by Professor Jeffrey G.
Sherman; (2) a blanket allowance of all marital restraints
centered on the value of honoring testator intent; (3) a case-by-
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case balancing approach used by the Feinberg II court in a recent
case; and (4) the possibility of pursuing a new test that does not
suffer from the same shortcomings as the Reasonableness Test.
Table 2 is included for convenience, summarizing the different
approaches to testamentary restraints on marriage.
Approach

Internal Reference

Reasonableness Test

Section II.A–B (Summary),

Section

III (Problems), Section V.B.4 (as
compared to the Coercion Test)
Prohibition of All Marital Restraints

Section IV.A (Summary), Section
V.B.1 (as compared to the Coercion
Test)

Allowance of All Marital Restraints

Section IV.B (Summary), Section
V.B.2 (as compared to the Coercion
Test)

Case-By-Case Balancing

Section IV.C (Summary), Section
V.B.3 (as compared to the Coercion
Test)

Coercion Test

Section V.A (Summary), Section V.B
(as compared to other approaches)

Table 2. Possible Approaches for Testamentary Restraints on
Marriage

The new test that this article has proposed—the Coercion
Test—is a sensible approach to testamentary restraints on
marriage. It avoids all four of the major problems with the
Reasonableness Test, it provides more respect for testator’s
intent than a blanket prohibition, it is more protective of public
policy than a blanket allowance, and it provides more consistent
results than a case-by-case balancing approach.
Most
importantly, the Coercion Test addresses the crux of the public
policy problem: whether an individual is being forced into, or out
of, marriage.

